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Abstract
With the recent rapid growth of interest in Multi-
Agent Systems, both in articial intelligence and soft-
ware engineering, has come an associated diculty
concerning basic terms and concepts. In particular,
the terms agency and autonomy are used with increas-
ing frequency to denote dierent notions with dier-
ent connotations. In this paper we lay the foundations
for a principled theory of agency and autonomy, and
specify the relationship between them. Using the Z
specication language, we describe a three-tiered hi-
erarchy comprising objects, agents and autonomous
agents where agents are viewed as objects with goals,
and autonomous agents are agents with motivations.
Introduction
Although there has been substantial progress in arti-
cial intelligence for many years, research tended to
focus on solving problems without regard to any real
external environment or to the notion of a reasoning
agent. In other words, the problems and their solu-
tions, while signicant, were limited in that they were
divorced from real situations. More recently, however,
the importance of these limitations has been recog-
nised. One consequence is the rapid growth of interest
in the design and construction of agents as systems
exhibiting intelligent behaviour.
Concepts of agents and agency are increasingly be-
ing used in a range of areas in articial intelligence
(AI) and computer science (Wooldridge & Jennings
1995). However, these notions are often dierent, even
within the same subeld, and the lack of a common
understanding can stie further research and develop-
ment. In distributed AI, agents are often taken to be
the same as autonomous agents and the two terms are
used interchangeably, without regard to their relevance
or signicance. The dierence between these related,
but distinct, notions is both important and useful in
considering aspects of intelligence.
In this paper, we dene autonomy and agency, and
explicate the relationship between them. We argue
that autonomy is distinct and is achieved bymotivating
agency. Our concern is to develop a formal model of
agency and autonomy that can be used both as the
basis of an implementation, and also as a precise but
general framework for further research.
Given the range of areas in which the terms agent
and agency are applied, the lack of consensus over
meaning is not surprising. As Shoham points out, the
number of diverse uses of the term agent are so many
that it is almost meaningless without reference to a
particular notion of agenthood (Shoham 1993).
In a recent collection of papers, for example, several
dierent views emerge. For Smith, an agent is a \per-
sistent software entity dedicated to a specic purpose"
(Smith, Cypher, & Spohrer 1994). Selker takes agents
to be \computer programs that simulate a human rela-
tionship by doing something that another person could
do for you" (Selker 1994). More loosely, Riecken refers
to \integrated reasoning processes" as agents (Riecken
1994). Others avoid the issue completely and leave the
interpretation of their agents to the reader. It is recog-
nised, however, that there is no agreement on what it
is that makes something an agent.
If we are to confront the problems that arise from
this lack of agreement and denition, then the use
of formalisms is appropriate since they allow unam-
biguous descriptions of complex systems, and also pro-
vide proof systems and sets of proof obligations which
enable the construction of reliable and robust mod-
els. Formalization provides clarity in characterizing
the nature of such important but ill-dened concepts
as agency and autonomy.
In the current work, we have adopted the specica-
tion language Z (Spivey 1992) for two major reasons.
First, it provides modularity and abstraction and is
suciently expressive to allow a consistent, unied and
structured account of a computer system and its associ-
ated operations. Such structured specications enable
the description of systems at dierent levels of abstrac-
tion, with system complexity being added at succes-
sively lower levels. Second, we view our enterprise as
that of building programs. Z schemas are particularly
suitable in squaring the demands of formal modelling
with the need for implementation by providing clear
and unambiguous denitions of state and operations
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on state which provide a basis for program develop-
ment. Thus our approach to formal specication is
pragmatic | we need to be formal to be precise about
the concepts we discuss, yet we want to remain directly
connected to issues of implementation. Z provides just
those qualities that are needed, and is increasingly be-
ing used for specifying frameworks and systems in AI
e.g. (Goodwin 1993).
Initial Concepts
In this section, we introduce terms and concepts that
will be used to explicate our understanding of agents
and agency, and provide formal denitions that are
used subsequently in developing the concept of auton-
omy.
Our view of agency best relates to that of Shoham
who takes an agent to be any entity to which men-
tal state can be ascribed (Shoham 1993). Accord-
ing to Shoham, such mental state consists of compo-
nents such as beliefs, capabilities and commitments,
but there is no unique correct selection of them. This
is sensible, and we too do not demand that all agents
necessarily have the same set of mental components.
We do, however, specify what is minimally required of
an entity for it to be considered an agent.
The denition of agency that follows is intended to
subsume existing concepts as far as possible. It will be
built up and extended over the course of the paper, and
will involve several intermediate concepts. In short, we
propose a three-tiered hierarchy of entities comprising
objects, agents and autonomous agents. The basic idea
underlying this hierarchy is that all known entities are
objects. Of this set of objects, some are agents, and
of these agents, some are autonomous agents. This is
shown as a Venn diagram in Figure 1. The following
sections dene what is required for each of the entities
in the hierarchy.
Before we can move to a denition of any of these
entities, we must rst dene some primitives. The rst
of these is an action which is strongly related to the
notion of agency.
Denition: An action is a discrete event which
changes the state of the environment.
The second primitive that needs dening is an at-
tribute. Attributes are simply features of the world,
and are the only characteristics which are manifest.
They need not be perceived by any particular entity,
but must be potentially perceivable in an omniscient
sense. (The notion of a feature here allows anything to
be included.)
Denition: An attribute is a perceivable feature.
Using the notions of actions and attributes, we pro-
vide denitions of agency and autonomy. In order to do
so, we must distinguish agents and autonomous agents
from other entities. We call such other entities objects,
and discuss them below.
At a basic level, an object can be dened in terms of
its attributes and its actions. An object, in this sense,
is just a describable `thing' or entity that is capable
of acting, and has no further dening characteristics.
This provides us with the basic building block to de-
velop our notion of agency.
Denition: An object is an entity that comprises a
set of actions and a set of attributes.
In Z, before constructing a specication, we must
rst dene types. Here we dene the set of all actions
and the set of all attributes:
[Action;Attribute]
Now a state schema can be constructed that de-
nes an object. Z schemas have two parts: the up-
per, declarative, part which declares variables and their
types, and the lower, predicate, part which relates and
constrains those variables. The type of any schema can
be considered as the cartesian product of the types of
each of its variables, without any notion of order, but
constrained by predicates.
The schema below has only a declarative part con-
taining two variables. First, capableof is the set of
actions of the object, and is sometimes referred to as
the competence of the object. Second, attributes is the
set of features of the object. Objects are therefore
dened by their ability in terms of their actions, and
their conguration (in a broad sense) in terms of their
attributes. The actions include any event in which
the object is involved. The conguration of an object
includes references to the body of the object and its
position, and is similar to Goodwin's notion of cong-
uration (Goodwin 1993).
Object
capableof : Action
attributes : Attribute
Attributes are manifest and are potentially accessi-
ble by an observer. The capabilities of an object in
terms of actions, by contrast, are not necessarily ob-
servable.
For example, consider a robot without a power sup-
ply. Since the robot has no power, its capabilities are
severely limited and include just those which rely on its
physical presence, such as supporting things, weighing
things down, and so on. The attributes of the robot
specify that it is blue, that it is upright, that it is
large, and other such features. As a second example,
consider a coee-cup. Its capabilities state that it can
support things and that it can contain liquid, for ex-
ample, while its attributes state that it is stable, white
and made of china. (These examples will be developed
further to distinguish between agents and autonomous
agents.)
An object must be situated in an environment. We
take an environment simply to be a set of attributes
that describes all of the features of the world and all
of the entities (objects, agents or autonomous agents)
in the world.
Environment == Attribute
An interaction is simply that which happens when
actions are performed in an environment. The eects
of an interaction on the environment are determined
by applying the eectinteraction function in the axiom
denition below to the current environment and the
actions taken. This axiom denition is a global vari-
able and is consequently always in scope. We require
only one function to describe all interactions, since an
action will result in the same change to an environ-
ment whether taken by an object, agent or autonomous
agent.
eectinteraction : Environment"
Action Environment
Agency
There are many dictionary denitions for an agent.
A recent paper (Wooldridge & Jennings 1994) quotes
the denition of an agent as \one who, or that which,
exerts power or produces an eect."
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However, they
omitted the second sense of agent which is given as
\one who acts for another : : :". This is important,
for it is not the acting alone that denes agency, but
the acting for someone or something that is dening.
Indeed, Wooldridge and Jennings acknowledge the dif-
culties in a purely action-based analysis of agency.
To understand better what actually constitutes an
agent, consider the example of a coee-cup. A cup is
an object. We can regard it as an agent and ascribe
to it mental state, but it serves no useful purpose to
do so without considering the circumstances. A cup is
an agent if it is containing a liquid and it is doing so
to some end. In other words, if I ll a cup with cof-
fee, then the cup is my agent | it serves my purpose.
Alternatively, the cup would also be an agent if it was
placed upside down on a stack of papers and used as
a paperweight. It would not be an agent if it was just
sitting on a table without serving any purpose to any
agent. In this case it would be an object. Note that
1
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we do not require an entity to be intelligent for it to
be an agent.
Thus agents are just objects with certain disposi-
tions. They may always be agents, or they may revert
to being objects in certain circumstances. This will
be explored further later. For the moment, we will
concentrate on the nature of the disposition that char-
acterizes an agent. An object is an agent if it serves a
useful purpose either to a dierent agent, or to itself,
in which case the agent is autonomous. This latter
case is discussed further later. Specically, an agent
is something that satises a goal or set of goals (often
of another). Thus if I want to store coee in a cup,
then the cup is my agent for storing coee. It has been
ascribed or, if we anthropomorphize, has `adopted', my
goal to have the coee stored. An agent is thus dened
in relation to its goals. We take a traditional view of
goals as describable environmental states.
Denition: A goal is a state of aairs to be achieved
in the environment.
Denition: An agent is an instantiation of an ob-
ject together with an associated goal or set of goals.
Before we can dene a schema for agency, we must
dene goals to be just a set of attributes that describe
a state of aairs in the world:
Goal == Attribute
The schema for an agent is simply that of an object
but with the addition of goals.
Agent
Object
goals : Goal
goals 6= f g
Thus an agent has, or is ascribed, a set of goals which
it retains over any instantiation (or lifetime). One ob-
ject may give rise to dierent instantiations of agents.
An agent is instantiated from an object in response to
another agent. Thus agency is transient, and an ob-
ject which becomes an agent at some time, may sub-
sequently revert to being an object.
Returning to the cup example, we have an agent with
the same attributes and actions as the cup object, but
now it can be ascribed the goal | my goal | of storing
my coee. Not everyone will know that it is an agent in
this way, however. If, for example, I am in a cafe and
there is a half-full cup of lemon-tea on my table, there
are several views that can be taken. It can be regarded
by the waiter as an agent for me, storing my tea, or
it can be regarded as an object serving no purpose if
the waiter thinks it is not mine. The view of the cup
as an object or agent is relevant to whether the waiter
will remove the cup or leave it at the table. Note that
we are not suggesting that the cup actually possesses
a goal, just that there is a goal that it is satisfying.
Consider also the robot example, and suppose now
that the robot has a power supply. If the robot has no
goal, then it cannot use its actuators in any sensible
way but only, perhaps, in a random way, and must be
considered an object. Alternatively, if the robot has
some goal or set of goals, which allow it to employ its
actuators in some directed way, such as picking up a
cup or riveting a panel onto a hull, then it is an agent.
The goal need not be explicitly represented, but can
instead be implicit in the hardware or software design
of the robot. It is merely necessary for there to be a
goal of some kind.
These examples highlight the range of behaviour
that is available from agents. The coee-cup is pas-
sive and has goals imposed upon and ascribed to it,
while the robot is capable of actively manipulating the
environment by performing actions designed to satisfy
its goals.
We now introduce perception. An agent in an envi-
ronment may have a set of percepts available. These
are the possible attributes that an agent could perceive,
subject to its capabilities and current state. However,
due to limited resources, an agent will not normally be
able to perceive all those attributes possible, and bases
action on a subset, which we call the actual percepts
of an agent. Some agents will not be able to perceive
at all. In the case of a cup, for example, the set of
possible percepts will be empty and consequently the
set of actual percepts will also be empty. The robot,
however, may have several sensors which allow it to
perceive. Thus it is not a requirement of an agent that
it is able to perceive.
For clarity of exposition, we dene a View to be the
perception of an Environment by an agent, and which
is just a set of attributes.
View == Attribute
It is also important to note that it is only mean-
ingful in our model to consider perceptual abilities in
the context of goals. Thus when considering objects
which have no goals, perceptual abilities are not rele-
vant. Objects respond directly to their environments
and make no use of percepts even if they are avail-
able. We say that perceptual capabilities are inert in
the context of objects.
In the schema for agent perception, AgentPercepts,
we add further detail to the denition of agency, and so
include the schema Agent . An agent has a set of per-
ceiving actions, perceivingactions, which are a subset of
the capabilities of an agent. The function, canperceive,
determines the attributes that are potentially avail-
able to an agent through its perception capabilities.
When applied, its arguments are the current environ-
ment and the agent's capabilities. The second predi-
cate line states that those capabilities will be precisely
the set of perceptual capabilities. Finally, the function,
willperceive, describes those attributes which are actu-
ally perceived by an agent, and will always be applied
to its goals.
AgentPercepts
Agent
perceivingactions : Action
canperceive : Environment"
Action Environment
willperceive : Goal" Environment"View
perceivingactions  capableof
8 env : Environment ; as : Action 
as 2 dom (canperceive env) )
as = perceivingactions
domwillperceive = fgoalsg
Directly corresponding to the goal or goals of an
agent is an action-selection function, dependent on the
goals, current environment and the actual perceptions.
This is specied inAgentAct below, with the rst pred-
icate ensuring that the function returns a set of actions
within the agent's competence. Note also that if there
are no perceptions, then the action-selection function
is dependent only on the environment.
AgentAct
Agent
agentactions : Goal"View"
Environment"Action
8 gs : Goal ; v : View ; env : Environment 
(agentactions gs v env)  capableof
domagentactions = fgoalsg
The state of an agent includes four new variables:
posspercepts, describing those percepts possible in the
current environment; actualpercepts, a subset of these
which are the current (actual) percepts of the agent;
willdo, the next set of actions the agent will perform;
and history , the sequence of actions previously per-
formed by the agent.
AgentState
environment : Environment
AgentPercepts
AgentAct
posspercepts : View
actualpercepts : View
history : seq (Action)
willdo : Action
8 as : ran history  as  capableof
actualpercepts  posspercepts
posspercepts =
canperceive environment perceivingactions
actualpercepts = willperceive goals posspercepts
perceivingactions = f g ) posspercepts = f g
willdo =
agentactions goals actualpercepts environment
Next, we dene which of the agent state variables
remain unchanged after a set of actions has been per-
formed by that agent. If any of these did change, a
dierent agent schema would have to be instantiated.
AgentState
AgentState
AgentState
0
capableof
0
= capableof
goals
0
= goals
perceivingactions
0
= perceivingactions
canperceive
0
= canperceive
willperceive
0
= willperceive
agentactions
0
= agentactions
We now specify how an agent interacts with its en-
vironment. As a result of an interaction, the environ-
ment and the AgentState change with certain variables
unaected as dened in AgentState. The performed
set of actions, willdo, is added to the history , and the
environment is altered accordingly.
AgentEnvInteract
AgentState
history
0
= history  hwilldoi
environment
0
=
eectinteraction environment willdo
Autonomy as Motivated Agency
So far we have developed a denition of agency. How-
ever, the denition relies upon the existence of other
agents which provide goals that are adopted in order
to instantiate an agent. In order to ground this chain
of goal adoption, to escape what could be an innite
regress, and also to bring out the notion of autonomy,
we introduce motivation.
Grounding the hierarchies of goal adoption demands
that we have some agents which can generate their own
goals. These agents are autonomous agents since they
are not dependent on the goals of others. Autonomous
agents possess goals which are generated from within
rather than adopted from other agents. These goals are
generated frommotivations which are higher-level non-
derivative components characterizing the nature of the
agent, but which are related to goals. Motivations are,
however, qualitatively dierent from goals in that they
are not describable states of aairs in the environment.
For example, consider the motivation greed. This does
not specify a state of aairs to be achieved, nor is it
describable in terms of the environment, but it may (if
other motivations permit) give rise to the generation
of a goal to rob a bank. The distinction between the
motivation of greed and the goal of robbing a bank
is clear, with the former providing a reason to do the
latter, and the latter specifying what must be done.
The following denition draws on Kunda's work on
motivation in psychology (Kunda 1990).
Denition: A motivation is any desire or prefer-
ence that can lead to the generation and adoption of
goals and which aects the outcome of the reasoning
or behavioural task intended to satisfy those goals.
A motivated agent is thus an agent that pursues its
own agenda for reasoning and behaviour in accordance
with its internal motivation. Since motivations ground
the goal-generation regress, we claim that motivation is
critical in achieving autonomy. An autonomous agent
must necessarily be a motivated agent.
Denition: An autonomous agent is an instanti-
ation of an agent together with an associated set of
motivations.
We can now specify an autonomous agent. First we
dene the set of all motivations as a base type.
[Motivation]
An autonomous agent is dened as an agent with
motivations and some potential means of evaluating
behaviour in terms of the environment and these moti-
vations. In other words, the behaviour of the agent is
determined by both external and internal factors. This
is qualitatively dierent from an agent with goals be-
cause motivations are non-derivative and governed by
internal inaccessible rules, while goals are derivative
and relate directly to motivations.
AutonomousAgent
Agent
motivations : Motivation
motivations 6= f g
In illustration of these ideas, note that the cup can-
not be considered autonomous because, while it can
have goals ascribed to it, it cannot generate its own
goals. The robot, however, is potentially autonomous
in the sense that it may have a mechanism for internal
goal generation depending on its environment. Sup-
pose the robot has motivations of achievement, hunger
and self-preservation, where achievement is dened in
terms of xing tyres onto a car on a production line,
hunger is dened in terms of maintaining power levels,
and self-preservation is dened in terms of avoiding
system breakdowns. In normal operation, the robot
will generate goals to attach tyres to cars through a
series of subgoals. If its power levels are low, how-
ever, it may replace the goal of attaching tyres with
a newly-generated goal of recharging its batteries. A
third possibility is that in satisfying its achievement
motivation, it works for too long and is in danger of
overheating. In this case, the robot can generate a goal
of pausing for an appropriate period in order to avoid
any damage to its components. Such a robot is au-
tonomous because its goals are not imposed, but are
generated in response to its environment.
Autonomous agents also perceive, but motivations,
as well as goals, lter relevant aspects of the en-
vironment. In the schema below, the function
autowillperceive is a more complex, but related, ver-
sion of an agent's willperceive. However, that which
an autonomous agent is capable of perceiving at any
time is independent of its motivations. Indeed, it will
always be independent of goals and motivations, and
there is consequently no equivalent increase in func-
tionality to canperceive.
AutonomousAgentPercepts
AutonomousAgent
AgentPercepts
autowillperceive : Motivation"Goal"
Environment"View
willperceive = autowillperceive motivations
domautowillperceive = fmotivationsg
The next schema denes the action-selection func-
tion and includes the previous schema denitions for
AgentAct and AutonomousAgent . The action-selection
function for an autonomous agent is produced at ev-
ery instance by the motivations of the agent, and is
always and only ever applied to the motivations of the
autonomous agent.
AutonomousAgentAct
AutonomousAgent
AgentAct
autoactions : Motivation"Goal"
View" Environment"Action
domautoactions = fmotivationsg
agentactions = autoactions motivations
The state of an autonomous agent in an environment
is dened as follows.
AutonomousAgentState
AutonomousAgentPercepts
AutonomousAgentAct
AgentState
As with objects and agents, we dene which vari-
ables remain unchanged after a set of actions has been
performed by that agent.
AutonomousAgentState
AutonomousAgentState
AutonomousAgentState
0
capableof
0
= capableof
perceivingactions
0
= perceivingactions
canperceive
0
= canperceive
autowillperceive
0
= autowillperceive
autoactions
0
= autoactions
Now we specify the operation of an autonomous
agent performing its next set of actions. Notice that
while no explicit mention is made of any change in
motivations, they may change in response to changes
in the environment. If they do change, then the
agent functions willperceive and agentactions will also
change. Further, motivations may generate new and
dierent goals for the agent to pursue. In any of these
cases, the characterizing features of an agent are in ux
so that an autonomous agent can be regarded as a con-
tinually re-instantiated non-autonomous agent. In this
sense, autonomous agents are permanent as opposed to
transient non-autonomous agents (which may revert to
being objects).
AutonomousAgentEnvInteract
AutonomousAgentState
history
0
= history  hwilldoi
environment
0
=
eectinteraction environment willdo
willperceive
0
= autowillperceive motivations
0
agentactions
0
= autoactions motivations
0
Discussion
There exists a small body of work that provides a sim-
ilar view to that presented here. For example, Covri-
garu and Lindsay describe a set of properties that char-
acterize autonomous systems to some \degree", relat-
ing to such factors as type and number of goals, com-
plexity, interaction, robustness, and so on (Covrigaru
& Lindsay 1991). In contrast, we dene what is nec-
essary for a system to be autonomous in very precise
terms, and we distinguish clearly between objectness,
agency and autonomy. One particular consequence of
the dierence in views is that we allow a rock, for ex-
ample, to be considered an agent if it is being used for
some purpose, such as a hammer for tent-pegs. Cov-
rigaru and Lindsay deny the rock the quality of au-
tonomy because it is not goal-directed, but ignore the
possibility of agency, skipping over an important part
of our framework. Other work includes that by Tokoro
who oers a related view in which he distinguishes ob-
jects, concurrent objects, autonomous agents and voli-
tional agents, similar in spirit to our own view (Tokoro
1993). In addition, Castelfranchi also characterizes au-
tonomy through the use of motivation (Castelfranchi
1994). Our work diers in that we take autonomy to
be an absolute concept which is constant regardless of
the context in which it occurs. It either exists or it
does not.
The notion of motivation is not new, and has been
used elsewhere. Simon, for example, takes moti-
vation to be \that which controls attention at any
given time," and explores the relation of motivation to
information-processing behaviour, but from a cognitive
perspective (Simon 1979). More recently, Sloman has
elaborated on Simon's work, showing how motivations
are relevant to emotions and the development of a com-
putational theory of mind (Sloman & Croucher 1981;
Sloman 1987). Others have used motivation and re-
lated notions in developing computational architec-
tures for autonomous agents such as motives (Norman
& Long 1994), and concerns (Moat & Frijda 1994).
What is new about our work is the role of motivation
in dening autonomy.
Conclusions
In the previous sections, we have constructed a formal
specication which identies and characterizes those
entities that are called agents and autonomous agents.
The work is not based on any existing classications
or notions because there is no consensus. Recent pa-
pers dene agents in wildly dierent ways if at all, and
this makes it extremely dicult to be explicit about
their nature and functionality. The taxonomy given
here provides clear and precise denitions for objects,
agents and autonomous agents that explicates those
factors that are necessary for agency and autonomy. In
addition, our formalization of these concepts is written
in the well-known language Z, which, through being
based on elementary set theory, is accessible to a wide
audience. Most usefully, perhaps, the specication is
constructed in such a way as to allow further levels of
specication to be added to describe particular agent
designs and architectures.
The framework provides an important basis for refer-
ence. We can classify both human and articial agents
equally well. Consider the relationship of a program-
mer to a program. Programs are always designed to
satisfy goals, but these goals are rarely explicit or able
to be modied independently of the programmer. The
programs lack goal-generating motivations, but can be
ascribed goals. In this respect, they are agents. Pro-
grammers typically develop programs according to sev-
eral motivations which determine how the program is
constructed. Time and eort must be balanced against
cost, ease of use, simplicity, functionality and other fac-
tors. Programmers consider these factors in determin-
ing the design of programs and in the goal or goals of
programs. Programmers can change the goals of pro-
grams by modifying code if desired, and can modify
their own goals to suit circumstances. In this respect,
programmers are autonomous agents.
The dierence between these kinds of programs as
agents and much recent use of the term is that the
relationship between the user (or programmer) and
the program has become explicit. Software agents as-
sist users. They adopt the goals of the users in the
tasks that they perform. Whether or not they are
autonomous depends on the ability of the agents to
function independently of those users, and to modify
their goals in relation to circumstances. This paper
has made explicit the relationships that have previ-
ously been implicit across the board in the vast range
of work on agency and autonomy, and provides a strong
formal base on which to build.
One aspect not addressed here, however, is exactly
how goals are generated from motivations. This is a
dicult issue, but work is progressing on developing
goal-generation mechanisms including eorts described
above. The next stage of this work is to formalize a
model of goal generation in the same way as the frame-
work has been constructed here, developing a complete
architecture for autonomous agents.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to John Campbell, Jennifer Goodwin, Paul
Howells, Colin Myers, Mark Priestley, John Wolsten-
croft and the anonymous referees for comments and
discussions on earlier drafts of this paper.
References
Castelfranchi, C. 1994. Guarantees for autonomy
in cognitive agent architecture. In Proceedings of
the 1994 Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures,
and Languages.
Covrigaru, A., and Lindsay, R. 1991. Deterministic
autonomous systems. AI Magazine 12(3):110{117.
Goodwin, R. 1993. Formalizing properties of agents.
Technical Report CMU-CS-93-159, Carnegie-Mellon
University.
Kunda, Z. 1990. The case for motivated reasoning.
Psychological Bulletin 108(3):480{498.
Moat, D., and Frijda, N. H. 1994. An agent archi-
tecture: Will. In Proceedings of the 1994 Workshop
on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages.
Norman, T. J., and Long, D. 1994. A proposal for
goal creation in motivated agents. In Proceedings of
the 1994 Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures,
and Languages.
Riecken, D. 1994. An architecture of integrated
agents. Communications of the ACM 37(7):107{116.
Selker, T. 1994. A teaching agent that learns. Com-
munications of the ACM 37(7):92{99.
Shoham, Y. 1993. Agent-oriented programming. Ar-
ticial Intelligence 60:51{92.
Simon, H. A. 1979. Motivational and emotional con-
trols of cognition. InModels of Thought. Yale Univer-
sity Press. 29{38.
Sloman, A., and Croucher, M. 1981. Why robots will
have emotions. In Proceedings of the Seventh Inter-
national Joint Conference on Articial Intelligence,
197{202.
Sloman, A. 1987. Motives, mechanisms, and emo-
tions. Cognition and Emotion 1(3):217{233.
Smith, D. C.; Cypher, A.; and Spohrer, J. 1994. Pro-
gramming agents without a programming language.
Communications of the ACM 37(7):55{67.
Spivey, J. M. 1992. The Z Notation. Hemel Hemp-
stead: Prentice Hall, 2nd edition.
Tokoro, M. 1993. The society of objects. Technical
Report SCSL-TR-93-018, Sony CSL.
Wooldridge, M. J., and Jennings, N. R. 1994. Agent
theories, architectures, and languages: A survey. In
Proceedings of the 1994 Workshop on Agent Theories,
Architectures, and Languages.
Wooldridge, M. J., and Jennings, N. R. 1995. Intel-
ligent agents: Theory and practice. Knowledge Engi-
neering Review 10(2).
